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BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This is a proceeding in certiorari pur~uant to the pro-
visions of 76-6-16, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, for review 
of an order of the Public Service Commission of Utah. For 
convenience the Public Service Commission of Utah will 
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sometimes hereafter be referred to as P.S.C.U. or as the 
Commission. The petitioner, Union Pacific Railroad Com-
pany, will sometimes hereafter be referred to as the railroad 
or the railroad company. 
Procedurally, this case originated when the P.S.C.U., 
on its own motion, set for hearing informal complaints con-
cerning the stock loading facilities of the railroad company 
at Wahsatch, Utah. Pursuant to notice, such hearing was 
commenced on the 18th day of August, 1947 before the 
P.S.C.U. at the State Capitol (Tr. 5) with several interested 
parties appearing. At that time it became apparent to the 
Commission that the party really interested in this matter 
as the adversary of the railroad company was Deseret Live 
Stock Company, a corporation engaged in fairly substantial 
livestock operations in Utah (Tr. 16 through 23). There-
upon the P. S. C. U. continued the hearing and required 
Deseret Live Stock Company to file a formal application 
showing what relief was sought in this proceeding by Des-
eret Live Stock Company (Tr. 23, 25, 26). In accordance 
with these instructions issued by the Commission, Deseret 
Live Stock Company, which will for convenience sometimes 
hereafter be referred to as the livestock company, filed a 
written petition seeking an order of the P.S.C.U. requiring 
the railroad company to construct a complete stock loading 
unit, including pens and trackage, on the north side of the 
railroad company's tracks between Wahsatch, Utah and 
the Wyoming state line. 
Upon such petition the matter was then heard by the 
Commission commencing on the 25th day of August, 1947. 
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After hearing a great deal of testimony and receiving num-
erous exhibits, the Commission took the matter under ad-
visement and on the lOth day of May, 1948 entered its order 
requiring the Union Pacific Railroad Company to construct 
certain stock loading facilities at a certain location near 
Wahsatch, Utah. The expense of constructing these facili-
ties would be approximately $25,000.00 on present construc-
tion prices. 
On June 1, 1948, within the time allowed by law, the 
railroad company filed with the Commission its petition for 
rehearing. This petition was denied by the Commission 
on July 14, 1948 and the railroad company, petitioner in 
these certiorari proceedings, perfected said certiorari pro-
ceedings. At the hearing commenced by the Commission on 
August 25, 1947 numerous parties appeared before the 
Commission and some pleadings were filed by other business 
organizations than the Deseret Live Stock Company, so 
that the defendants named above in the title of this pro-
ceeding, all of whom apparently had an interest in this 
matter, were joined as defendants along with the P.S.C.U. 
and the Deseret Live Stock Company in this certiorari pro-
ceeding. 
STATEl\IENT OF FACTS 
The Union Pacific Railroad Company is, and for many 
years has been, a common carrier of freight and passengers 
by rail, engaged in interstate commerce. As a part of its 
system it maintains a double main line track between east-
ern points and western points, which said double track in the 
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vicinity of Wahsatch, Utah runs approximately east and 
west. The southerly track of these two tracks handles east-
bound trains and the northerly track handles westbound 
trains (Ex. 10, Tr. 40). 
For approximately forty years the Union Pacific has 
maintained certain stock loading facilities at Wahsatch, 
Utah, which are located on the south side of these double 
tracks. These stock loading facilities, consisting of pens, 
loading chutes and suitable trackage for the storage of 
empty cars, are adequate in size to accommodate all busi-
ness which is presently handled by the railroad company at 
Wahsatch, Utah, except in exceptional emergencies where 
all shippers in that area desire to use the loading facilities at 
the same time. Mr. Dansie, manager of the Deseret Live 
Stock Company and its principal witness, stated that his com-
pany could use about four more pens in the present facilities 
(Tr. 92); but he admitted that the present facilities, as to 
size at least, were adequate in normal situations (Tr. 104). 
In substantiation of this fact the railroad company 
showed by its records of all shipments from Wahsatch, 
either in or out, that the loading facilities now in existence 
there are used to less than five per cent of capacity computed 
on a year-round basis. These figures were based on 1946 
usage, which was the last full year before the hearing (Tr. 
419). The evidence also shows that during 1946 the loading 
facilities were actually used upon only 58 separate days. 
Considering 58 days as the time of each year during which 
the loading facilities are used-still only 28 per cent of the 
capacity of the loading facilities a.t Wahsatch, Utah present-
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Iy maintained by the railroad was required for all loading 
or unloading of livestock at that spot (Tr. 419). These 
figures were computed on shipments of all shippers using 
the facilities at Wahsatch, whether in shipments from or 
to this particular point. Admittedly these figures are based 
upon the assumption that all parties concerned in the load-
ing or unloading of any livestock perform their varied func-
tions efficiently (Tr. 425, 426). Nevertheless, it remains 
abundantly clear that with a margin of 72 per cent of un-
used capacity on the days when the loading yards are used, 
reasonable cooperation between the shippers and the rail-
road company, together with reasonable efficiency, renders 
the present facilities absolutely adequate in size to handle 
such business as is now transacted by the railroad at Wah-
satch, Utah. 
Mr. David E. Howard, manager of the Bountiful Live 
Stock Company and a witness for Deseret Live Stock Com-
pany, suggested that two more loading chutes be installed 
in the present facilities, that there be some reconditioning of 
these facilities; that a few cinders be dumped in some mud-
hole, and that some lighter boards be supplied for runway 
boards into the cars (Tr. 187, 188). Otherwise, in his opinion, 
the stockyards were fully adequate, at least as to size (Tr. 
188, 189). 
We parenthetically here observe that the railroad com-
pany has always been, and still is, willing to make such 
minor repairs and alterations as are suggested above or as 
may from time to time become necessary for maintaining 
the adequacy of the loading facilities. 
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It is significant to note that the P. S.C. U. did not find 
that the present facilities for loading and unloading stock 
at Wahsatch were inadquate in size (Report of Commission); 
rather, the Commission after finding dangers in driving 
livestock across the track, said in paragraph No. 10 of its 
Report: "That for the shippers from the north the present 
stock loading facilities of said railroad at Wahsatch, Utah are 
not reasonable or adequate." It is therefore clear that the 
Commission based its order upon a determination that the 
facilities were not adequate because of their location. The 
basic complaint of the Deseret Live Stock Company and the 
sole basis upon which the P. S. C. U. made the order com-
plained of, is that the present stock loading facilities at 
Wahsatch are inadequate in that they require Deseret Live 
Stock Company to move its livestock across the tracks either 
before loading or after unloading. This problem was the focal 
point of most of the evidence adduced; and the evidence con-
cerning the same requires some detail in stating. 
The present facilities for stock loading and unloading 
at Wahsatch, which have been in existence for about forty 
years (Rep. of Com., par. 5), were originally located on the 
single main line track of the railroad. Since that time, how-
ever, the railroad company has constructed the present 
double track main line and the old main line track is now a 
spur which is part of the trackage used by the railroad in 
servicing the loading facilities at Wahsatch (Rep. of Com., 
par. 5, Ex. 1). These stockyards have been used for many 
years by shippers in this area. At the present time all of 
these shippers, except Deseret Live Stock Company and the 
Francis interests, ship to or from the south side of the tracks 
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and the south side of the stockyards so that there is no 
necessity for other shippers to trail any livestock across the 
, tracks of the railroad company for shipping purposes (Tr. 
469). The Francis interests ship very moderate amounts of 
livestock (Tr. 467, Ex. 12), which in 1946 consisted in total 
of three car-loads. It therefore becomes plainly apparent 
that the only problem presented in this case centers around 
the operations of the Deseret Live Stock Company. The 
livestock company owns large areas of land north of Wah-
satch, which constitute its summer range. Some distance 
away in Tooele County, Deseret Livestock Company also 
owns other land and federal grazing permits, which it uses 
as winter range. In the spring of each year the livestock 
company ships several thousand sheep and cattle to Wah-
satch by rail and in the fall it ships back from W ahsatch 
to Tooele County to take advantage of the different graz-
ing seasons, all of this traffic going through the present 
loading facilities (Tr. 31, 32, 33). We here call to the court's 
attention, however, the statement made by Mr. Dansie that 
_ there is no guarantee that such shipments will continue in 
the future and that the same may, in the discretion of the 
livestock company, be discontinued at any time, without 
any notice, if other means of transportation appear more 
favorable to the livestock company (Tr. 151). In reality, of 
course, this fact needs no testimony from Mr. Dansie or any-
~ one else for support since it is obvious that any shipper may 
at any time decide to use some other means of transporta-
tion than railroad for the shipment of its products and its 
livestock. 
In addition to the above mentioned shipments between 
,, winter and summer rangeS, there are also some shipments of 
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livestock made by Deseret Live Stock Company to various 
markets, which shipments are made from Wahsatch, and 
there are also shipments of wool from W ahsatch to various 
eastern markets. The shipments of livestock to market 
places throughout the nation usually take place in the fall 
(Tr. 38), at approximately the same time as the shipments 
from the summer range at Wahsatch to the winter range 
in Tooele County. 
Thus the use of the Wahsatch facilities by the Deseret 
Live Stock Company, which seeks to require a very large 
expenditure on the part of the railroad company for ad-
ditional facilities, is clearly confined to a relatively short 
percentage of each year. 
The present means by which Deseret Live Stock Com-
pany reaches the loading facilities now in existence when 
shipping from W ahsatch is as follows, - the livestock, 
whether sheep are cattle, are trailed to a track crossing about 
on~quarter mile east from the present loading facilities; 
there the trains are flagged and the livestock are driven 
across the tracks. They are then driven west about one-
quarte'r mile to the present loading equipment. While thus 
traveling west on the south side of the tracks the stock is 
between the railroad tracks and U. S. Highway 30. U.S. 
Highway 30 is roughly parallel to the tracks in this area and 
is approximately 200 feet south of the tracks as they now 
exist (Ex. 1). When shipping livestock to Wahsatch an 
exactly reverse procedure is used in unloading. Deseret 
Live Stock Company complains that this crossing, together 
with the ne,cessity of driving stock one-quarter of a mile be-
tween the tracks and U. S. 30, is so dangerous that it renders 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
the whole present facility inadequate. In support of the 
proposition Deseret offered evidence that sheep and cattle 
were on occasion frightened by trains and tracks, that on 
occasion they tended to stampede when near railroad facili-
ties, that loss of weight was sometimes thus caused due to 
stampeding, that sometimes sheep ran onto U. S. 30 in 
their fright, and that in the opinion of the Deseret's wit-
nesses the lives of their employes and of travelers on the 
highway were endangered by this manner of handling what 
were claimed to be uncontrollable animals. 
We wish at this point to call to the court's attention 
the obvious fact that it is impossible to ship living live-
stock by rail without having said livestock at railroad tracks 
where engines and cars must be present; that even if a load-
ing yard and chutes were constructed on the north side of 
the track it would still be necessary to have this range stock 
near tracks, engines and cars when such livestock were 
shipped from Wahsatch or to Wahsatch; and that Deseret 
Live Stock Company's witness admitted that even under 
the most favorable circumstances there is a tendency of 
mivestock to stampede when close to railroad equipment (Tr. 
94). 
The crossing itself and the stockyards now being used 
may best be described by referring the court to the photo-
graphs introduced at the hearing and the maps also in-
troduced. Exhibit 2 is a photograph which shows a view 
to the north from the crossing of the approach to the cross-
ing which is used in trailing livestock from the north side of 
the tracks across the railroad tracks (Tr. 108, 109). Exhibit 
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3 is a photograph showing another view of the same loca-
tion. Exhibit 4 shows the terrain and the road westwardly 
from the crossing which is now used in trailing livestock 
from the crossing westwardly to the stockyards. U. S. 
Highway 30 appears at the left of this photograph (Tr. 
110, 113). Exhibit 5 is a photograph taken from a position 
a short distance east of the place from which Exhibit 4 was 
taken. In Exhibit 5 the camera was facing west and this 
photograph shows some of the buildings complained of by 
the livestock company as constituting an unusual hazard 
(Tr. 111). Exhibit 6 is a photograph taken from a point 
still farther east looking west and showing the "metropolis" 
which it is claimed is so dangerous in trailing livestock. Ex-
hibit 6 was taken from a point east of the crossing and 
south of the same so that by examining Exhibits 4, 5, 6 and 
9 (hereinafter referred to) it is possible to visualize every 
hazard presented by the terrain in driving the stock west-
wardly from the crossing to the stock loading facilities (Tr. 
114). That this is not a labyrinth 8.Iong which it should be 
impossible to trail even range livestock seems too clear to 
require further comment. Exhibit 7 is a photograph taken 
from approximately the center of the crossing looking west-
wardly showing the railroad tracks of the Union Pacific 
main line; Exhibit 8 is a different view of the approach to 
the crossing looking northward from the tracks, and Ex· 
hibit 9 shows the station at Wahsatch which is west of the 
crossing and east of the stockyards themselves (Tr. 119). 
A fair summary of the facts revealed by these pictures 
is that the crossing and the terrain where livestock must 
move between the tracks and Highway U.S. 30 is relatively 
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open country distinctly rural in character; that the crossing 
presents no unusual hazards in its approach; that there i~ 
ample room between the tracks and U.S. 30 to move livestock 
west to the stockyards after making the crossing; that the 
terrain is reasonably level so far as the path of the livestock 
is concerned ; and that the hazard complained of in the way 
of building structures consists of a few scattered sheds, small 
dwellings, a tank, and a station. 
The witnesses for the livestock company in an attempt to 
exaggerate the situation there present describe various alleged ' 
obstacles in the terrain which in their judgment increased the 
difficulty of the crossing. For example, Mr. Dansie described 
a twenty-foot high embankment allegedly immediately west 
of the crossing on the north side of the tracks. This em-
bankment appears clearly in Exhibit 7 but as is also· clear 
from Exhibits 2, 3, 4 and 8, said embankment does not in..: 
terfere with the crossing itself. We call the court's atten• 
tion to the fact that the photographs were identified as 
fairly descriptive of the situation by the manager of the 
Deseret Live Stock Company and we respectfully submit 
that said photographs do not fairly allow any other descrip-' 
tion of the physical terrain than is set forth above. 
As to the layout of the present stock loading facilities 
themselves, we refer the court to Exhibit 1 and the testi~ 
mony concerning the same at pages 133, 134 and 135 of the 
Transcript. 
The evidence before the Commission also disclosed that 
in order for the public to have a practical m€ans of using. 
the stockyards ordered by the Commission to be constructed 
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on the north side of the tracks, it would be necessary for the 
public to cross land of the Deseret Live Stock Company (Tr. 
144). Therefore, the Commission required Deseret to give 
an easement across its land sufficient for the construction 
of the stockyards and also an easement 600 feet in width 
running east from the railroad crossing to the proposed 
stockyards. This 600 foot easement as ordered by the Com-
mission runs parallel with the tracks and immediately north 
of the railroad right of way (Order of the Commission). 
Thus the inconsistency of the Commission's order clearly 
appears. In effect, the Commission has said by its order 
in this cause that in order for the new stockyards to con-
stitute a true public facility it is necessary for the public 
to have a right of way over the Deseret lands. The Com-
mission has further said that this use of the new stock-
yards requires the trailing of livestock along this 600 foot 
easement east from the crossing to the proposed stockyards. 
It is therefore significant to observe that use of the new 
facilities by anyone other than the Deseret Live Stock Com-
pany people involves the following movement: "Crossing a 
double track and then trailing livestock eastwardly down 
a corridor of land to loading facilities." At most, any dis-
tinction between this proposed facility as it would be furn-
ished to the general public and the present facility as furn-
ished to the Deseret Live Stock Company is one of very 
slight degree. 
It is also petitioner's contention that the evidence dis-
closes the following facts which will be of consequence in 
the argument herein contained. The evidence thereon will 
be discussed at appropriate places in the argument. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
1. The present crossing over the tracks is a 
private crossing and not a public crossing. 
2. The railroad has adopted a policy which has 
governed its conduct for many years, pursuant to 
what is known as General Order 15, of requiring all 
shippers to pay for all trackage and facilities off the 
railroad right of way which are private in nature. 
This is important if it be determined that the new 
stockyards will in fact be a private facility, because 
in such event compliance with the order of the 
P.S.C.U. will constitute the giving of a preference 
to Deseret Live Stock Company in absolute viola-
tion of the Interstate Commerce Act. 
3. There is absolutely no evidence in the rec-
ord made before the Commission as to the minimum 
requirements of the shippers from the north of the 
tracks in the way of loading facilities; and certainly 
there is no evidence that the facilities shown in Ex-
hibit 10, which were ordered constructed by the Com-
mission, constitute the minimum requirements for 
reasonable facilities on the north side of the tracks 
at Wahsatch, Utah. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS 
1. The Commission acted arbitrarily and un-
lawfully and erred in finding that the present stock 
loading facilities are not reasonable or adequate. 
2. The Commission acted arbitrarily and un-
lawfully and erred in making the order requiring the 
railroad company to construct the new facilities 
therein mentioned, in that compliance with the same / 
by the railroad company will require the raiTroad 
company to violate the Interstate Commerce Act, and 
consequently, said order of the P.S.C.U. is unlawful. 
3. The Commission acted arbitrarily and un-
lawfully and erred in finding that the proposed facil-
ities will be public in nature. 
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4. The Commission acted arbitrarily and un-
lawfully and erred in requiring the railroad company 
to construct said new facilities in that no evidence 
in the record supports the conclusion that a program 
of the magnitude required by the Commission's order 
is necessary for the north side of the tracks and 
shippers located thereon at Wahsatch, Utah, to cor-
rect any alleged inadequacy which may exist, said 
alleged inadequacy being specifically denied by peti-
tioner. 
5. The Commission acted arbitrarily and un-
lawfully and erred in issuing its order requiring the 
construction of additional loading facilities without 
making sufficient findings relative to the facts relied 
on in support thereof. 
6. The Commission acted arbitrarily and un-
lawfully and erred in denying the railroad com-
pany's petition for rehearing. 
ARGU:MENT 
THE COMMISSION ACTED ARBITRARILY AND 
UNLAWFULLY AND ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
PRESENT STOCK LOADING FACILITIES ARE NOT 
REASONABLE OR ADEQUATE. 
The first contention made by the railroad company as 
presented by the first assignment of error above is that the 
Commission acted arbitrarily and unlawfully and erred in 
finding the present stockyards inadequate and unreasonable. 
We state at the outset that the jurisdiction of the Commis-
sion to enter any order on the subject of increased facilities 
must be grounded on the provisions of 76-4-7, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1943. This section provides as follows: 
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"76-4-7. Rules, Equipment, Service - Regulation 
After Hearing. 
Whenever the commission shall find, after a 
hearing, that the rules, regulations, practices, equip-
ment, appliances, facilities, or service of any public 
utility, or the methods of manufacture, distribution, 
transmission, storage or supply employed by it, are 
unjust, unreasonable, unsafe, improper, inadequate 
or insufficient, the commission shall determine the 
just, reasonable, safe, proper, adequate or sufficient 
rules, regulations, practices, equipment, appliances, 
facilities, service or methods to be observed, fur-
nished, constructed, enforced or employed, and shall 
fix the same by its order, rule or regulation. The 
commission, after a hearing, shall prescribe rules 
and regulations for the performance of any service 
or the furnishing of any commodity of the character 
furnished or supplied by any public utility, and on 
proper demand and tender of rates such public utility 
shall furnish such commodity or render such service 
within the time and upon the conditions provided in 
such rules." 
No other statute which we are able to discover would 
warrant any action by the Commission of the character such 
as the order complained of in these proceedings. Apparently 
in realization of this fact the Commission found that the 
present facilities of the railroad company at Wahsatch were 
inadequate and unreasonable. (Report of Commission, par. 
10). 
We respectfully urge that if the Commission erred in 
making such .finding the whole basis for its order fails and 
that the Commission was completely· without jurisdiction to 
enter the order made. This must 'be so since the legislature 
which created the jurisdiction of the Commission to make 
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such orders as the one complained of also provided the 
qualifications which justified the same in 76-4-7, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1943. 
It is apparent from the record made before the Com-
mission as pointed out in the foregoing statement of facts 
and also from the findings of the Commission as contained 
in its report, that the sole factor in the present stock loading 
facilities which can even be argued as inadequate or un-
reasonable is their location. Every stock loading facility 
has to be built on one side of the tracks or the other and 
the :record shows that as to shippers from the south of the 
tracks the present location is advantageous. Certainly from 
the evidence produced at the hearing it cannot be said that 
the choice of the south side of the tracks for the present 
stock loading facilities by the railroad was an unreasonable 
one since the majority of the shippers, with nearly one-half 
the transportation business, are located on that side of the 
track. Therefore, the problem resolves itself into a determin-
ation as to whetheT or not the present stockyards are in-
adequate or unreasonable merely because the location of 
the same requires shippers from the north side of the tracks 
to trail their livestock across the tracks. 
The Union Pacific Railroad Company is a common 
carrier of livestock. As such we concede that it has a duty 
to the public to furnish reasonably adequate loading and 
unloading facilities at Wahsatch, Utah with reasonable 
means of ingress and egress; but the railroad is in the 
transportation business and the duty to furnish reasonable 
and adequate facilities extends only so far as transporta· 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
tion is concerned. In the case of Atchison, Topeka & Santa 
Fe Rail·wa.y Co., et al. v. United States, et al., 295 U. S. 193, 
55 Sup. Ct. 7 48, 79 L. Ed. 1382, suit was brought by several 
railroad carriers against the United States and the Inter-
state Commerce Commission to enjoin enforcement of an 
order of the I.C.C. A three judge district court dismissed 
the suit and appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of the 
United States. By a complaint before the I.C.C. a company 
called the Hygrade Company had attacked as unreasonable 
and in violation of the Interstate Commerce Act the carrier's 
tariff charges applicable to switching livestock to the 
packing plant of the Hygrade Company. The complaint be-
fore the Commission also assailed yardage charges collected 
by a livestock company on livestock delivered at the stock-
yards. It appeared that the railroad carriers delivered stock 
to the stockyards company who then turned the same over 
to the Hygrade Company. The railroad charged a small sum 
for each car for unloading as part of its tariff and in addi-
tion the stockyards company, in accordance with tariffs 
filed with the Secretary of Agriculture by it, collected a 
charge on all livestock received in the yards. The complaint 
of the Hygrade Company was to the effect that it being a 
part of the duty of a common carrier to provide reasonable 
unloading facilities no charges should have been made other 
than the charges for transportation. The Commission found 
in favor of t!1e Hyrade Company. In passing upon this prop-
osition the Supreme Court of the United States made the 
following observations: 
"Transportation of ordinary live stock in car-
load lots from and to points other than public stock-
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yards has always been deemed to include furnish-
ing of facilities at the place of shipment for loading 
and at destination for unloading and suitable ways 
for convenient ingress and egress." 
However, it appeared in this case that part of the service 
rendered by the stockyards company was the furnishing of 
a special route from the stockyards company to the plant 
of the Hygrade Company. In passing upon this matter it 
therefore became important to determine whether or not 
a special means of ingress or egress was an additional ser-
vice furnished by the carrier or by the stockyards company 
of such a nature as to entitle the carrier or the stockyards 
company to make an extra charge therefor, and in determin-
ing this issue the Supreme Court of the United States said: 
"Plainly there is an essential difference between 
the route from unloading pens to consignee's plant 
and a mere way out to the public highways. Trans-
portation does not include delivery within the Hy-
. grade plant or the furnishing of the properties, over-
head runway and all, that are used for that purpose. 
Usage and physical conditions combined definitely 
to end transportation, at least in respect of these 
shipments, with unloading into suitable pens as is 
now required by Section 15 (5). (Interstate Com-
merce Act.) " 
This case represents a square ~olding by the Supreme 
Court of the United States that the duty of the carrier to 
furnish reasonable loading and unloading facilities ends 
when the carrier has furnished suitable chutes and pens 
for this process, together with a convenient way for the 
shipper to reach a public highway to and from such pens 
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and chutes. In other words, the transportation of livestock 
ends at the time when the same have been unloaded and 
a suitable means of access to a public highway has been 
furnished. To require a railroad company to go further and 
to provide a means by which the livestock may be moved 
from the unloading facilities to the lands of the consignee 
goes beyond the duty of transportation imposed upon a rail-
road carrier. We therefore assert that the facilities, equip-
ment, service or appliances mentioned in 76-4-7, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1943, must refer only to such additional facili-
ties, equipment, service or appliances as are concerned in 
the transportation of livestock and that the same are in no 
way connected with additional facilities not a part of the 
transportation. Consequently, the Public Service Commis-
sion of Utah may not require additional facilities, equip-
ment, service or appliances in no way connected with the 
actual transportation of livestock. Any other rule results 
in a practical absurdity. If a carrier provides suitable 
loading and unloading facilities and a suitable means of 
ingress from and egress to a public highway, it will have 
done all that it is possible for a railroad to do as to most 
shippers of livestock, for the reason that most shippers do 
not own land which abuts a railroad track. For example, 
as to an individual owning land upon which livestock was 
grazed north of the lands of the Deseret Live Stock Com-
pany at Wahsatch, Utah, the railroad company would be 
absolutely incapable of providing a direct means of approach 
to any stock loading facilities without condemning large 
portions of the Deseret Company's lands. Consequently, 
the only rational rule, compliance with which can be ex-
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pected of any common carrier, is that the carrier be required 
to furnish adequate stock loading and unloading facilities, 
together with a reasonable means of ingress and egress to 
a public highway. Certainly that has been done in the 
instant case both as to Deseret Live Stock Company and all 
other shippers in the W ahsa tch area. Indeed, in the instant 
case the railroad company has made available facilities 
which not only afford reasonable access to a public high-
way so far as Deseret Live Stock is concerned, but also a 
crossing over its tracks with flag protection against trains, 
which permits the livestock to be driven directly onto the 
property of the livestock company. Under these circum-
stances, we are unable to comprehend how it can be said 
that the railroad company has failed to furnish adequate 
and reasonable loading and unloading facilities at Wah-
satch, Utah. 
Unless this court is prepared to hold that it is the duty 
of the railroad company to provide means of ingress to and 
egress from its stock loading facilities directly upon the 
lands of any and all shippers of livestock, then it cannot 
fairly be said that the present ,facilities at Wahsatch, Utah 
are inadequate. Although no complaint has been made by 
shippers from the south of Wahsatch as to the means of in-
gress and egress to the present loading yards, nevertheless, 
if the reasoning which the Commission adopted in making 
the order complained of is sound, then even as to such ship-
pers from the south the present facilities are inadequate. 
This is inevitably true because it is impossible for all of these 
·shippers to own land immediately adjacent to the present 
stock loading facilities at Wahsatch, and it is also unques-
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tionably the fact that the railroad does not furnish any par-
ticular route by which said shippers may trail their live-
stock either to or from the lands upon which they are grazed 
by their owners. 
That the scope of the carrier's duty is to supply reason-
able facilities for transportation purposes and no other has 
heretofore been determined by the Supreme Court of the 
United States in the case of Great Northern Railway Co. v. 
State of Minnesota ex rel. State Railroad & Warehouse 
Commission, 238 U. S. 340, 35 Sup. Ct. 753, 59 L. Ed. 1337. 
In that case the Public Service Commission of the State of 
Minnesota had ordered the Great Northern Railway Com-
pany to construct a stock scales at a particular point along 
its line. The railroad company asserted, as does the rail-
road company in this case, that such order constituted a 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution in that it constituted the taking of the railroad 
company's property without due process of law. In passing 
upon this proposition the Supreme Court made the follow-
ing statements: 
"Manifestly, if the order is enforced plaintiff 
in error's property will be taken. * * * The 
business of a railroad is transportation and to sup-
ply the public with conveniences not connected there-
with is no part of its ordinary duty. The obvious 
purpose of the challenged order was to enforce instal-
lation at Bertha of a scale like those at Eagle Bend 
and Hewitt and dedicated to same use. Under ad-
mitted facts, unless justified by alleged unlawful 
discrimination, we think this was an arbitrary and 
unreasonable exercise of power. It is no answer to 
say, as counsel do, that the Commission has 'general 
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authority to require railroad companies to supply the 
necessary demands of the public along transportation 
lines; that it has a right to require the company to 
build and maintain such facilities as are necessary 
for the public needs.' The demands upon a carrier 
which lawfully may be made are limited by its duty, 
and the present record conclusively shows the re-
quired structure had no direct relation thereto." 
More simply stated, perhaps, our argument in this par-
ticular is as follows : The route from the present loading 
facilities to Deseret's land is not part of the facilities of the 
railroad for the transportation of livestock and is there-
fore no basis for determining the facilities themselves to 
be inadequate or unreasonable. 
We submit that in view of the holding of the Great 
Northern case cited above, the Commission's order not only 
is unlawful because it is contrary to the provisions of 76-4-7, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, but it 3:lso constitutes a vio-
lation of the XIV Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution. 
We therefore respectfully urge that transportation of 
livestock requires of the carrier only that it furnish ade-
quate loading and unloading facilities with reasonable 
means of ingress and egress to a public highway as dis-
tinguished from a convenient route direct to the lands of 
the consignee. The evidence before the Commission abso-
lutely demonstrated that the present facilities do furnish 
adequate means for the loading and unloading of such live-
stock as is handled at Wahsatch, Utah, together with reason-
able means of access to said facilities from a public high-
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way. In fact, the evidence of the Deseret Live Stock Com-
pany shows that U. S. 30 is so close to the facilities that 
sometimes livestock get onto the highway without any 
desire therefor upon the part of the herders. These factors 
should make it plainly evident that the Commission arbi-
trarily and unlawfully erred in finding the present facilities 
at Wahsatch to be inadequate and unreasonable. But aside 
from this proposition, we respectfully urge that the Com-
mission arbitrarily and unlawfully erred in such finding 
in that the requirement imposed by law to furnish adequate 
facilities does not contemplate duplication of facilities on 
both sides of a track in order to avoid inconvenience to 
shippers. Neither the federal law nor the state statutes 
administered by the Public Service Commission of Utah 
may impose upon a common carrier an expenditure in ex-
cess of $20,000.00 unless the same constitutes a reasonable 
regulation of the carrier's business. To impose such ex-
pense upon any other basis is to deprive the carrier of its 
property without due process of law in violation of the Utah 
Constitution and the Constitution of the United States. 
See the Great Northern Railway Co. case, supra. 
The uncontradicted testimony of Mr. Phelps, a witness 
for the railroad company, shows that there are no rural 
shipping facilities for stock on the whole Union Pacific 
, system with which he is acquainted where some shippers do 
not have to cross a main line track (Tr. 420). If the railroad 
must duplicate the present facilities at Wahsatch on the 
north side of the tracks, there seems no good reason why 
the railroad should not also be required in proper proceed-
ings to duplicate any stock loading facilities on both sides 
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Qf its tracks at every rural shipping point throughout its 
whole railroad system. We cannot conceive that this is 
reasonable. It is as though the residents on the east side of 
Main Street in Salt Lake City requested an additional 
passenger depot at some east side location because they 
disliked the danger of crossing Main Street to reach the 
present passenger depot at Third West and South Temple 
Streets. 
In the case of Central Stockyards Co. v. Louisville & 
Nashville Railway Co., 192 U.S. 568, 48 L. Ed. 565, 24 Sup. 
Ct. 339, the Supreme Court of the United States was called 
upon to consider a somewhat similar problem. In that case 
the Louisville & Nashville Railway Company had refused 
to receive livestock tendered to it outside the State of 
Kentu~ky for delivery to certain stockyards known as the 
Central Stockyards. These yards were located on the line 
of the Southern Railway Company in Louisville, Kentucky. 
The defendant, Louisville & Nashville Railway Company, 
maintained a similar stockyard setup known as the Bourbon 
Stockyard in Louisville and declined to receive livestock 
billed to the Central Stockyards or to deliver livestock 
destined to Louisville, Kentucky at any other place than the 
Bourbon yards. This refusal was despite the fact that there 
were railroad connections between the Louisville & Nashville 
Railway Company and the Southern Railway Company so 
that it was physically possible to make delivery of live-
stock at the Central Stockyards without the construction 
of any new facilities. The plaintiff claimed the right to 
compel delivery of livestock by the defendant railway com-
pany at the Central Stockyards under the Interstate Com· 
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merce Act of February 4, 1887, Chapter 104, Section 3, 
which made it unlawful for common carriers to give un-
reasonable preferences and required them to afford all 
reasonable, proper and equal facilities for the interchange 
of traffic between the lines of such carrier and other car-
riers in interstate commerce. In discussing the right of 
the plaintiff to the relief requested the court removed from 
its consideration all procedural matters and went on to 
discuss the merits of the proposition contended for by the 
plaintiff. In holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to 
the relief prayed for Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the 
Supreme Court of the United States, said: 
"If the cattle are to be unloaded, then, as was said 
in Covington Stock-Yards Company v. Keith, the de-
fendant has a right to unload them where its appli-
ances for unloading are and cannot be required to 
establish another set hard by." 
The court further specifically held that the fact that the 
Central Stockyards were public stockyards did not in any 
manner affect the case. While we concede that the court in 
the Central Stockyards Company case was primarily con-
cerned with the question as to whether the failure of the 
defendant railroad to deliver stock at the Central Stock-
yards constituted an unreasonable preference, we respect-
fully submit that the reasoning is applicable to the case at 
bar. Unless the facilities presently located at Wahsatch, 
Utah constitute a discrimination as against the Deseret 
Live Stock Company in its shipping, we are unable to per-
ceive how the same can be said to be unreasonable or in-
adequate. 
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In the case of Covington Stock-Yards Co. v. Keith, 139 
U.S. 128, 35 L. Ed. 73, 11 Sup. Ct. 461, the Supreme Court 
of the United States recognized the duty of a railroad com-
pany holding itself out as a common carrier to provide suit-
able means and facilities for receiving livestock offered 
to it for shipment in the following language: 
"The railroad company, holding itself out as a 
carrier of live stock, was under a legal obligation, 
arising out of the nature of its employment, to pro-
vide suitable and necessary means and facilities for 
receiving live stock offered to it for shipment over 
its road and connections, as well as for discharging 
such stock after it reaches the place to which it is 
consigned. The vital question in respect to such 
matters is, whether the means and facilities so fur-
nished by the carrier or by some one in its behalf 
are sufficient for the reasonable accommodation of 
the public." 
The question involved in that case was one of charges for 
use of certain stockyards but the court went on to say, at 
page 136 of the U. S. Reports, as follows: 
"We must not be understood as holding that the 
railroad company, in this case, was under any legal 
obligation to furnish, or cause to be furnished, suit-
able and convenient appliances for receiving and 
delivering live stock at every point on its line in 
the city of Covington where persons engaged in 
buying, selling or shipping live stock, chose to estab· 
lish stock yards. In respect to the mere loading and 
unloading of live stock, it is only required by the 
nature of its employment to furnish such facilities 
as are reasonably sufficient for the business at that 
city." 
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In the case of State ex rel. Railroad Com'rs. v. Florida, 
East Coast Ry. Co., 68 So. 761, the Supreme Court of Florida 
was concerned with the situation where the Railroad Com-
. missioners of Florida had ordered the defendant railroad 
company to perform certain switching operations on side 
tracks without charge. The court said at the very outset, 
as the basic premise upon which it made the final determina-
tion, that the charges could be lawfully collected: 
"The railroad company has a right to load or 
unload its cars where its facilities or appliances for 
such work are, and it would be unreasonable to re-
quire it to establish other facilities to accommodate 
each patron. (Citing Cases)." * * * "So in Mis-
souri Pacific R. R. Co. v. State of Nebraska, 217 
U. S. 196, 30 Sup. Ct. 461, 54 L. Ed. 727, it was held 
that the carrier could not be required to build more 
private connections because the obligation was not 
involved in the carrier's public duty, and the require-
ment went beyond the reasonableness of the state's 
protective power." 
In conclusion we submit that the finding of the Com--
mission that the present facilities are inadequate is erron-
eous, arbitrary and unlawful for the following reasons: 
1. That the law does not impose upon the carrier the 
duty to furnish facilities for loading or unloading of live-
stock which include a direct and convenient route to the 
lands of the consignee or of the shipper, but only requires 
the furnishing of reasonable facilities with access to a 
public highway. 
2. That it is unreasonable to find that the present 
facilities are inadequate when the only complaint which 
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may fairly be made with reference to the same is that it 
would be more convenient for the Deseret Live Stock Com-
pany to have an additional facility on the other side of the 
tracks. 
THE COMMISSION ACTED ARBITRARILY AND 
UNLAWFULLY AND ERRED IN MAKING THE ORDER 
REQUIRING THE RAILROAD COMPANY TO CON-
STRUCT THE NEW F AGILITIES THEREIN MEN-
TIONED, IN THAT COMPLIANCE WITH THE SAME 
BY THE RAILROAD COMPANY WILL REQUIRE THE 
RAILROAD COMPANY TO VIOLATE THE INTER-
STATE COMMERCE ACT AND CONSEQUENTLY, SAID 
ORDER OF THE P.S.C.U. IS UNLAWFUL. 
The second contention which we wish to urge for the 
court's consideration logically raises the matters presented 
by our assignments of error 2 and 3. In support of this argu-
ment we now assert to the court that the new facilities re-
quired by the Commission will not be public in nature but 
will instead be private. We have heretofore, in the statement 
of facts contained in this brief, discussed some of the evi-
dence relative to this matter but it now appears necessary 
to call to the court's attention certain other portions of the 
evidence dealing with this particular problem. As hereto· 
fore pointed out, the new facilities will be available to 
shippers from the south side of the tracks only if said ship· 
pers follow a route across the main line double track of the 
Union Pacific Railroad and thence eastwardly along a 
corridor of land 600 feet wide to the new stockyards. In 
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view of the fact that the shippers from the south concede 
the present facilities on the south side of the tracks to be 
adequate for their needs, as shown by the evidence, it is a 
practical absurdity to suppose that these shippers will ever 
use the new loading and unloading pens if the same are con-
structed pursuant to the Commission's order. There is no 
reason to expect any shipper from the south to undertake 
what we concede is an inconvenience of crossing the double 
main line tracks. Consequently, common sense requires the 
conclusion that the only shippers who ever will use the 
facilities to be constructed pursuant to the Commission's 
order will be shippers from the north side of the tracks. 
Under present conditions there are only two business enti-
ties using the railroad facilities who ship either to or from 
the north side of the track. These shippers are Deseret 
Live Stock Company and the Francis interests. As was 
heretofore pointed out, the Francis interests shipped three 
carloads of livestock in 1946, the last full year before the 
hearing conducted by the Commission, and consequently, 
the last year upon which figures were available. This amount 
of transportation business is so relatively insignificant that 
for all practical purposes the sole shipper from the contem-
plated loading and unloading facilities will be Deseret Live 
Stock Company. This is the practical view of the fact situa-
tion presented before the Commission. 
In addition, there is the legal matter as to who is en-
titled to the use of the proposed facilities. The evidence 
discloses that the only means of reaching these new far>iHt~ns 
for shippers from the south is by use of the railroad crossing 
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now used by Deseret in approaching or leaving the present 
facilities. This crossing is not a public crossing. There is no 
evidence before the Commission of any nature which we 
are able to discover in the transcript which justifies the 
conclusion that this crossing is available to the public gen-
erally. To the contrary, the evidence is that there is a gate 
across the roadway approaching this crossing (and this gate 
is plainly visible in the photographs introduced as exhibits) 
which is locked as to the general public and is not available 
as a means of crossing the railroad's right of way. Mr. 
Palmer, a witness for the railroad, so testified (Tr. 501). 
Mr. Dansie conceded that at least during a part of each year 
the gate was locked (Tr. 666, 667). Certainly it cannot be 
said that the evidence discloses that the present crossing 
is a public crossing in light of this testimony and it is sig-
nificant that nowhere in its report did the Commission find 
that the present railroad crossing was a public crossing. 
Such being the situation, we are unable to perceive how 
it is possible to contend that as to shippers from the south 
of the tracks there is any legal right to the use of the present 
crossing. Consequently, it is difficult for us to see how it 
fairly can be argued that the shippers from the south have 
a right to use the proposed new stockyard facilities. As to 
shippers from the north, the only legal basis upon which 
those shippers could get their livestock to the stockyards is 
by use of the 600 foot strip ordered made into a public 
easement by the Public Service Commission of Utah in the 
order complained of; but this affords no legal means by 
which shippers from the north could arrive at the 600 foot 
strip with their livestock. Such shippers would have to 
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cross vast areas of Deseret Live Stock land if they desired 
to approach from the north and there is no legal requirement 
that the Deseret Live Stock Company furnish any such 
approach shown by the evidence. If it be the thought of the 
Commission that shippers from the north could arrive at 
the crossing on the south side of the tracks by the use of 
some public highway, then we respectfully urge that there 
is no legal right of any such shippers to the use of the 
crossing. Consequently, whether the situation be viewed 
from a practical or from a legal standpoint, the proposed 
facilities are private in nature. 
Heretofore the Supreme Court of the State of Utah had 
occasion to pass upon the public character of a utility ser-
vice in the case of Garkane Power Co., Inc. v. Public Service 
Commission, 98 Ut. 466, 100 P. (2) 571. In that case the 
court was concerned with a determination as to whether 
the Garkane Power Co., Inc., which was a nonprofit mem-
bership corporation, was a public utility and thus within 
the control and regulation of the Public Service Commission 
of Utah. In determining whether this company was a pub-
lic utility the court quoted with approval from two other 
cases as follows : 
" 'The test * * * is * * * whether the 
public has a legal right to the use which cannot be 
gainsaid, or denied, or withdrawn, at the pleasure 
of the owner.'" Farmers' Market Co. v. R. R. Co., 
142 Pa. 580, 21 A. 902, 989, 990. 
" 'The essential feature of a public use is that 
it is not confined to privileged individuals, but is 
open to the indefinite public. It is this indefiniteness 
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or unrestricted quality that gives it its public char-
acter.'" Thayer v. California Development Board, 
164 Cal. 117, 127, 128 P. 21, 2:5. 
Under this definition the facilities which are to be con-
structed, if the order of the Public Service Commission of 
Utah is sustained, are not public in nature because there 
will be no right in the public generally to secure admittance 
to the same, and as has been heretofore said, if the matter 
be viewed from a practical standpoint the conclusion is in-
escapable that the new stockyards are for the sole benefit 
of Deseret Live Stock Company. 
Title 49, Section 3, Subsection (1), United States Code 
Annotated, as contained in the 1947 Cumulative Annual 
Pocket Part, provides as follows : 
"Sec. 3. Preferences ; interchange of traffic; 
terminal facilities-Undue preferences or prejudices 
prohibited 
(1) It shall be unlawful for any common car-
rier subject to the provisions of this chapter to make, 
give, or cause any undue or unreasonable preference 
or advantage to any particular person, company, 
firm, corporation, association, locality, port, port 
district, gateway, transit point, region, district, ter-
ritory, or any particular description of traffic, in any 
respect whatsoever; or to subject any particular per-
son, company, firm, corporation, association, locality, 
port, port district, gateway, transit point, region, 
district, territory, or any particular description of 
traffic to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or 
disadvantage in any respect whatsoever; Provided, 
however, That this paragraph shall not be construed 
to apply to discrimination, prejudice, or disadvantage 
to the traffic of any other carrier of whatever de-
scription." 
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This paragraph of the Interstate Commeree Act thus clearly 
prohibits a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce 
by rail, as is the Union Pacific Railroad Company, from 
giving unreasonable preference to any corporation includ-
ing Deseret Live Stock Company. 
The uncontradicted testimony before the Commission 
given by the witness Pidcock for the railroad company is 
to the following effect: In 1918 when the railroads were 
under the control of the government an order known as 
General Order 15 provided in effect that the railroad com-
panies would build spur trackage facilities and other facili-
ties of a similar character at their own expense to the clear-
ance point and that from the clearance point the shipper 
would be required to incur all other expense. Thereafter, of 
course, the government relinquished control of the railroads 
but in order to have a uniform policy, so that it might not be 
said that preference or discrimination existed, the railroad 
company has consistently followed said General Order 15. 
In this manner uniformity of policy has been afforded to 
all shippers over the Union Pacific Railroad Company. Cer-
tainly, if the railroad company promiscuously ignored the 
policy of complying with General Order 15 by building spur 
tracks for one shipper and refusing to build spur tracks or 
facilities for another shipper, it could not fairly be said that 
the railroad was supplying facilities to all and discrimina-
tion or preference as to none. Since the proposed stockyards 
are off the right of way of the railroad company in the 
instant case and therefore fall within the class of spur track-
age and facilities which ordinarily would only be constructed 
at the expense of the shipper, it is our contention that the 
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order of the Public Service Commission of U tab requires 
the Union Pacific Railroad Company to violate the provi.: 
sions of the Interstate Commerce Act quoted above. We 
concede that this contention must be based upon a conclu-
sion that the proposed stock loading facilities are not public 
in nature but are, in fact, of a private character for the 
benefit of the Deseret Live Stock Company. This is true 
because General Order 15 and the policy of the railroad 
has never forbidden the railroad to pay the expense of truly 
public facilities, whether within the clearance point or not. 
The evidence with reference to the railroad's policy as cre-
ated by General Order 15 is to be found at pages 548 to 569, 
inclusive, of the Transcript, together with Exhibit 19 which 
is a copy of what is known in the railroad world as General 
Order 15. 
It is our further contention, as shown by our assign-
ment of error No. 3, that the Commission acted unlawfully 
and arbitrarily in finding that the new facilities would be 
public in nature. We have examined the transcript of all 
the testimony carefully and we are able to find nothing to 
support any such conclusion with the exception of the testi-
mony of Mr. Dansie, which is found in the Transcript at 
page 661 through 662. However, it is noted that Mr. Dansie 
conceded the crossing gate was locked during a portion of 
each year. He ventured as his opinion that it was locked 
to keep the cattle from getting on the railroad but there is 
no necessity for locking a gate to keep cattle from getting 
through so long as the gate is properly fastened and we 
would be interested in seeing any authority to support the 
proposition that a crossing which may be kept locked dur-
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ing any substantial period of time each year is in fact a 
public crossing available as a matter of right to the public 
at all times. 
The cases discussing unlawful preferences as given to 
various shippers by railroad carriers are of course legion 
in number. Suffice it to say that the following cases have 
all held that the furnishing of additional facilities or ser-
vices of a nature generally similar to the facilities in ques-
tion in this case constituted unlawful preferences or dis-
criminations in violation of the Interstate Commerce Act 
quoted above: 
United States v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 
266 U.S. 191, 45 Sup. Ct. 43, 69 L. Ed. 243; 
Interstate Stockyards Co. v. Indianapolis Union 
Ry. Co., 99 Fed. 472; 
Sioux City Terminal Railway Switching, 241 
I. C. C. 53; decided July 8, 1940; 
Lehigh Valley Railroad Co. v. United Lead Co., 
133 A. 290. 
Since the court's conclusion on this matter will have 
to rest upon a determination as to whether the proposed 
facilities are in fact public or whether they are private in 
nature, we feel there is no use in belaboring the matter 
further and we submit the contention for the court's deter-
mination. 
THE CO:MMISSION ACTED ARBITRARILY AND 
UNLAWFULLY AND ERRED IN REQUIRING THE 
RAILROAD COMPANY TO CONSTRUCT NEW FACILI-
TIES IN THAT NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD JUST-
IFIES THE MAGNITUDE OF THE PROGRAM REQUIRED 
BY THE COMMISSION'S ORDER. 
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The next portion of the argument which we submit 
for the court's consideration is based upon assignments of 
error Nos. 4 and 5 heretofore set forth. The basic premise 
upon which we rely in submission of this phase of the brief 
may simply be stated as follows: Even if it be determined 
that the railroad failed to furnish adequate and reasonable 
facilities at Wahsatch, Utah, nevertheless the jurisdiction 
of the Commission is limited to a determination of the 
minimum reasonabl~et requirements for adequacy of said 
facilities and then an order based upon such finding requir-
ing the construction of the same. In other words, we sub-
mit that inadequacy or unreasonableness of the present 
facilities can never justify the Public Service Commission 
in requiring the railroad to do more than to make the facili-
ties reasonable and adequate and can never justify the Com-
mission requiring the ultimate in perfection as to said 
facilities. In the case of Mountain States Telephone & Tele-
graph Co. v. Public Service Commission, et al., 105 Uta;h 
230, 142 P. (2d) 873, this principle was clearly presented 
to the court. In that case the Public Service Commission had 
made a determination that the intrastate rates of the tele-
phone company constituted discrimination against intrastate 
telephone users as compared with the inteTstate rates then 
in effect. It was also shown that the interstate rates had 
been accepted by the telephone company as reasonable and 
upon such facts the Public Service Commission ordered the 
telephone company to cause its intrastate rates to be made 
uniform with its interstate rates. When this matter was 
presented to the Supreme Court of Utah Mr. Justice Wolfe, 
speaking for the court, denied the authority of the Public 
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Service Commission of Utah to so rule. It is clear that the 
reason for the overruling of the Commission's decision in 
that case was the failure of the Commission to take adequate 
evidence as to the reasonability of the interstate rates when 
applied to intrastate calls and to have made a fair determina-
tion as to whether or not said interstate rates were reason-
able when applied to intrastate calls. The court pointed out 
that upon a showing that the interstate rates had been 
accepted as reasonable by the utility it then became in-
cumbent upon the utility to explain any difference which it 
might seek between the interstate rates and the intrastate 
rates to be ordered by the Commission. However, the util-
ity demonstrated by its evidence that there was a j ustifica-
tion for some differential between interstate rates and 
intrastate rates. The Supreme Court of this State pro-
nounced the rule that in those circumstances the Commis-
sion's order fixing the intrastate rates at the same prices as 
the interstate rates was therefore unlawful. We submit 
that the same reasoning applies to the case at bar. Even 
though this court be of the opinion that. the Public Service 
Commission of Utah is correct in its finding that the present 
facilities of the railroad at W ahsatch are inadequate, never-
theless, it is our contention that before the order of the 
Commission requiring the construction of the loading facili-
ties shown in Exhibit 10 can be sustained there must be suf-
ficient evidence in the record made before the Commission, 
together with a finding of the Commission, to justify the 
conclusion that said proposed facilities constitute the min-
imum reasonable facilities at said location as distinguished 
from the ultimate in facilities at Wahsatch. There is an 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
38 
absolute dearth of any evidence in the record to show that 
the expenditure in excess of $20,000.00 to be required in 
the construction of the proposed stockyards is the minimum ,
1 
• 
necessary to render the present facilities adequate. 
The only reference which is made throughout the 
Transcript to the facilities ordered constructed by the Com-
mission is by railroad witnesses. The diagram offered in 
evidence by the railroad was produced for the purpose of ;·, · 
showing that in order ~o comply with Mr. Dansie's requests ~: 1 
a very substantial sum of money would have to be expended. 1 . 
The evidence reveals that this diagram was prepared by 
the Engineering Department of the railroad company upon 
orders of the offici~s of the railroad when Mr. Dansie 
requested additional facilities at W ahsatch. The evidence 
shows that this diagram was made pursuant to the policy 
of the railroad to ascertain the cost of the requested im-
provements and the general situation which would be en-
countered by the railroad in attempting to comply with the 
shipper's request. Not one word of evidence from the rail- : 1 
road's witnesses or others describes these facilities as the 
minimum necessary to render the present facilities adequate. 
As a matter of fact, there is not one word of evidence which 
we are able to discover in the transcript dealing with the 
requirements of the Deseret Live Stock Company or other 
shippers from the north of the tracks in the way of railroad 
facilities. It is true that the size of the shipments to be 
made by the Deseret Live Stock and the nature thereof is 
outlined in a general way by the testimony of Mr. Dansie 
and others, but as to the requirements of the Deseret people 
in the way of facilities no shred of evidence was produced. 
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If the law of Utah requires the Public Service Commission 
to determine the reasonableness of the proposed facilities 
from evidence, there can be no justification for the order 
complained of in these proceedings. Certainly, such is and 
must be the law of this State. In the first place, the provi-
sions of 76-4-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, heretofore 
referred to, require that the Commission conduct a hearing 
before making an order such as the order made in this case. 
There can be no purpose for such hearing except to entitle 
the railroad or other utility to offer evidence as to the 
adequacy or inadequacy of the existing facilities, and fur-
ther, for the shipper to offer evidence as to what shall con-
stitute reasonable, proper, and adequate facilities. This 
section of our statutes also provides that the Commission 
shall determine the just, reasonable, proper and adequate 
equipment, facilities, appliances. and service .. Certainly in 
view of such provision it must have been contemplated by 
the legislature that the Commission base its determination 
upon evidence to be offered at the hearing. The Supreme 
Court of Utah required such action on the part of the Com-
mission in the Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Com-
pany case referred to above. 
It may be contended that a different rule applies under 
76-4-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, than under the statute 
in question in the telephone company case because the pro-
visions of the statute in the telephone company case spe-
cifically provided that the Commission was required to make 
a finding as to what would be just, reasonable and sufficient 
rates (see 76-4-4 U. C. A. 1943); but the language used in 
the two statutes is so nearly identical that no fair distinction 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
40 
may be drawn. In 76-4-4 the statute provides that "the 
Commission shall determine the just, reasonable or suffi-
cient rates," and in 76-4-7 the statute provides that "the 
Commission shall determine the just, reasonable, safe, ~: 1 
proper, adequate or sufficient equipment, appliances, facil-
ities or service." There being no valid distinction which ;~ 1 
we are able to perceive between the wording of these two 
statutes we feel that the opinion of the Supreme Court of j 1 
the State of Utah in the Mountain States Telephone & Tele-
graph Company case absolutely required of the Commission 
in the instant case that it take evidence as to what would 
be a reasonable improvement in the present facilities to 
make them adequate. Such simply was not done at the time 
of the hearing. The only place where the reasonability or 
adequacy of the proposed facilities is even discussed lies 
in the testimony of Mr. Terwilliger and in the testimony of 
Mr. Pidcock, both witnesses for the railroad, and those 
gentlemen were concerned with and testified concerning 
the difficulties the new stockyards would present--not with 
reference to their adequacy. In its report the Commission 
makes the following statement in paragraph 10 thereof: 
"Such a structure will cost an estimated $20,000.00, which 
is a reasonable expenditure considering the convenience of 
the public, economy of operation of the railroad, and con-
venience of shippers and amount of track at Wahsatch, 
Utah." 
To blandly state that an expenditure in excess of $20,-
000.00 will create a reasonable facility without exploring 
in any manner the possibility of remedying any defect in 
the facilities at a lesser price is so inherently unlawful as 
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to appear almost ridiculous. For example, one of the 
primary objections urged by the Deseret Live Stock people 
as to the adequacy of the present facilities was the danger 
presented by U. S. Highway 30 as it paralleled the tracks 
of the railroad company. Common sense tells us that this 
danger could be almost eliminated, if not entirely so, by 
fencing between the railroad right of way and U. S. 30. 
Complaint is also made as to the nature of the crossing but 
no evidence was presented by the Deseret people, nor re-
quested by the Commission, which shows that the crossing 
could not be improved at a substantially less expensive price 
than $20,000.00 so as to render the facilities now in exist-
ence absolutely reasonable to all shippers. Complaint was 
made by the Deseret people that the engines and cars of 
the railroad company frightened the stock which are shipped 
to and from Wahsatch but there is no finding and no evi-
dence which suggests that the proposed facilities will elimi-
nate this danger and inconvenience or will even substan-
tially improve the same. Mr. Dansie stated that there would 
be improvement because the sheep or cattle could be con-
fined in corrals rather than being at large as the locomotives 
or trains proceeded in the vicinity; but it would still be 
necessary to approach any new stockyards with the cattle 
or sheep and there is no evidence in the record as to the 
improvement in the stampeding damage which might be 
expected by the construction of other and additional stock-
yards on the north side of the tracks. Certainly there is 
no finding by the Commission as to any of these matters 
other than as is quoted above. 
In the case of Los Angeles & Salt Lake Railroad Co. v. 
Public Utilities Commission of Utah, et al., 80 Ut. 455, 15 
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P. (2) 358, the Supreme Court of Utah had occasion to 
pass upon a somewhat similar matter. In that case the 
Public Utilities Commission of Utah had ordered that an 
agency be maintained by the railroad company at St. John, 
Utah to facilitate the business of shippers upon the grounds 
that without said agency the facilities of the railroad were 
not reasonable and adequate. At the time of the petition for 
rehearing the railroad company offered to install a tele-
phone at St. John, which would apparently obviate any 
difficulty theretofore existing. Mr. Justice Wolfe, then a 
District Court judge, sitting with the Supreme Court, and 
speaking for the court, said in his opinion as follows: 
"There is nothing in the evidence adduced at 
the hearing on the application for rehearing or the 
other testimony (from) which the Commission could 
conclude that the installation of this telephone to-
gether with all the other means available to the 
shippers would not be reasonable and adequate ser-
vice required by the statute. We cannot say that it 
would or would not. That is not our province. It 
may be that the installation of a telephone would 
still leave the situation such that the shipper could 
not obtain the reasonable and adequate service re-
quired by the statute. * * * We do not believe 
that the Commission sufficiently explored the possi-
bilities which the installation of a telephone would 
accomplish." 
'The court goes on to say in overruling the order of the 
·Commission and remanding the same to the Commission 
for further hearing : 
"Whether the commissiOn makes an order re-
quiring a service on insufficient evidence or whether 
·:-
·~ I 
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it makes an order denying an application without 
sufficient evidence to support the denial can make 
no difference in principle." 
Certainly this case may be said to stand for two proposi-
tions-(!), that it is improper and unlawful for the Com-
mission to order the alteration of presently inadequate or 
unreasonable facilities in such a manner as to cause large 
expense when there is a more simple and cheaper method of 
making the facilities reasonable and adequate, and (2), that 
the Commission should explore the possibilities of cheaper 
means of improving the facilities before requiring expendi-
tures of large sums of money to create a facility in exact 
accordance with the demands of the various shippers. 
As applied to the case at bar, we submit that before 
ordering the railroad company to build a stock loading 
facility costing in excess of $20,000.00 at the whim of the 
Deseret Live Stock Company, the Commission should have 
taken evidence as to the minimum requirements of ade-
quacy and reasonability at Wahsatch and should have ex-
plored the possibility of rendering the present facilities 
adequate by other means than the contemplated stockyards. 
Failure of the Commission to take such evidence should 
render its decision unlawful; and failure of the Commission 
to make a finding with reference to other possible solutions 
to the problem which Deseret encounters in its shipping 
makes it impossible for the Supreme Court to determine 
whether or not the Commission was guided by such evi-
dence as may be discovered in the record concerning the 
necessity for additional stockyards on the north side of the 
tracks at Wahsatch, Utah. 
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THE COMMISSION ACTED ARBITRARILY AND ~t 
UNLAWFULLY AND ERRED IN DENYING THE RAIL- } 
ROAD COMPANY'S PETITION FOR REHEARING. 
All of the matters discussed in the foregoing argument 
with reference to this proceeding were properly raised be-
fore the Public Service Commission of Utah by the railroad 
company's petition for rehearing, which was denied; con-
sequently, if we be correct in any one of the arguments 
which we have heretofore advanced as to any of the matters 
therein discussed, the Commission acted unlawfully and 
arbitrarily in denying said petition for rehearing. We 
further contend that by its order requiring the construc-
tion of the stockyards and by its denial of the railroad 
company's petition for rehearing, for the reasons herein-
above set forth, the Public Service Commission of Utah will 
be depriving the petitioner in these proceedings of its prop- • 1 
erty without due process of law, in violation of the XIV 
Amendment of the Unit~d States Constitution and also of 
the Constitution of the State of Utah, if the order made 
by the Commission is affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
In final summation of our position with reference to 
this whole matter we paraphrase the statement of Mr. 
Justice Folland in the case of Logan City v. Public Utilities 
Commission of Utah, 77 Ut. 442, 296 P. 100. Mr. Justice 
Folland's statement has nothing to do, legally speaking, with 
the problem presented by these certiorari proceedings but 
his language states more aptly than we may conceive our-
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selves the principles which should be controlling in the 
final determination of this case: 
· ''The location and manner of placing stockyards 
and stock loading facilities is essentially a matter of 
business management of the railroad which should 
not be interfered with by the Public Service Commis-
sion of Utah, unless it is made to appear that the 
place chosen by the management for said stockyards 
or stock loading facilities was chosen in bad faith 
or involved gross inefficiency or presented an un-
reasonable choice. It is well settled that the Public 
Service Commission of Utah cannot, under the guise 
of regulating the reasonability and adequacy of the 
facilities of a railroad, take into its hands the man-
agement of a railroad's property and thus interfere 
with the rights of such management." 
We respectfully urge the court to determine that the 
order of the Public Service Commission of Utah, together 
with its denial of the railroad company's petition for re-
hearing, is unlawful as in violation of the statutes of Utah, 
the Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution 
of the State of Utah, and that said order be declared null 
and void. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Howard F. Coray 
of Counsel 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
BRYAN P. LEVERICH 
M. J. BRONSON 
A. U.MINER 
HOWARD F. CORAY 
Counsel for Petitioner 
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